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Recent increases in physician-hospital (i.e., vertical) integration has spurred both op-
position on the grounds of anti-trust concerns and support on the basis of lowering
transaction costs and improving communication. This paper examines the effects of
vertical integration on quality of care as measured by malpractice claims.The study
employs four data sets from the state of Florida (FL AHCA Financial Data, AHA Sur-
vey Data, FL AHCA Discharge Data, and FL Malpractice Claims from the Office of
Insurance Regulation) culminating in an unbalanced panel dataset for the years 1998
to 2013. I utilize a linear model with hospital and year fixed effects as a well as a
negative binomial model with hospital and year fixed effects. I find that vertically in-
tegrated hospitals have 7% fewer claims per year as compared to hospitals that are not
vertically integrated. In addition, vertically integrated hospitals see a decline of about
$522,000 in costs associated with malpractice claims per year. These results provide
support for previous literature that finds vertical integration improves communication
among health care providers, thereby avoiding events that lead to malpractice suits. In
addition, these results indicate that vertical integration stands to benefit both patients
(through fewer claims and improved quality of care) as well as hospitals (through a




2 Literature Review 4
2.1 Prices and Spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Transaction Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 Health Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4 Quality Improvement Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.5 Quality of Care and Malpractice Claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3 Data 9
3.1 Data Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9












Physician-hospital integration is defined as an “ownership relationship” between
hospitals and physician practices as opposed to a “contractual relationship” [Baker et
al (2014)]. Physician-hospital integration appeared in the 1980s and 1990s as a re-
sponse to rising health care costs and as “a response to rapidly expanding managed
care health insurance” [Cuellar et al (2006)]. “Mergers, acquisitions, internal restruc-
turing, and new inter-organizational relationships occurred at a record pace” [Bazzoli
(2004)] at that time. Managed care plans contract with selected physicians, hospitals,
and other health care providers. The rise of managed care plans made it financially
sensible for both physicians and hospitals to form close knit relationships - partnership
allowed for greater bargaining power. As explained by Berenson, “Hospitals and physi-
cians. . . realized that by working more closely together, they could acquire managed
care contracts and sometimes accept and manage financial risk” [Berenson (2017)].
Changes in compensation structure led not only to the development of physician-
hospital integration, but also to the formation of other integrated systems such as
“management services organizations (MSOs), foundations, and integrated healthcare
organizations (IHOs)” [Morrisey (1996)].
Although the late 1990s experienced rapid increase in integration, integration de-
creased drastically by the turn of the century. As explained by Martin Gaynor, “In-
tegration between hospitals and physician practices peaked in 1996 at approximately
40% of all hospitals, and declined thereafter” [Gaynor (2006)]. Integration between
hospitals and physicians picked up again around the mid-2000s. A study with hospital
data from 240 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) found that physician-hospital in-
tegration “increased from 2008 to 2012 by a mean of 3.3 percentage points” [Neprash
(2015)].
Rising administrative costs, spikes in emergency room utilization coupled with
spikes in uncompensated care, and the malpractice crisis of the early 2000s lead to
sky rocketing hospital costs. It seems intuitive that rising health care costs followed
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with an increase in vertical integration. In comparing American and Canadian med-
ical spending, Cutler and colleagues (2011) find that spending is “$1,589 per capita
higher - that is, 120 percent higher - in the United States than in Canada” [Cutler
(2011)]. As explained in the paper, this difference can be attributed to “44 percent
more administrative staff in the U.S. healthcare system than in the Canadian system”
[Cutler (2011)]. If vertical integration allows physicians and hospitals to cut down on
administrative costs, it seems rational that providers would explore integration as a
cost saving option.
Although, vertical integration features consolidation of services and, therefore, in-
creases in market share of a given hospital/organization, the benefits associated with
vertical integration may outweigh competition concerns. In this paper, I exploit vari-
ation in hospital adoption of integration to examine the effects of physician-hospital
integration on health outcomes and quality of care as measured by prevalence of mal-
practice claims.
This paper proceeds as follows: First, I discuss results and implications from pre-
vious literature, both for and against vertical integration. Next, I describe the steps
and data sets used to construct the final unbalanced panel data set. Then I discuss the
model and covariates used in analysis. Then I proceed to discuss results. I conclude
with an overview of limitations and discussion of result implications.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Prices and Spending
Literature against the integration of physicians and hospitals presents evidence
of reduced competition and increased prices. In a study with data from the Ameri-
can Hospital Association (AHA) Survey and 2.1 million claims from Truven Analytics
MarketScan, Baker, Bundorf, and Kessler have found that a one-standard deviation
increase in the market share of vertically-integrated hospitals is associated with an
increase in prices of 3.2 percent [Baker et. al 2014]. Among the explanations discussed
4
for observing such an effect is the ability to “bundle services”, thereby pressuring insur-
ance companies to pay higher prices for the same services. The higher prices charged
to insurance companies can be carried over to the individual, manifesting as higher
prices for insurance premiums for individuals. Another study, with data on 7, 391,335
nonelderly enrollees, concluded that vertical integration is associated “with a mean in-
crease of $75 (95% CI,$38-$113) per enrollee in annual outpatient spending (P¡0.001)
from 2008 to 2012. . . This increase in outpatient spending was driven almost entirely
by price increases because associated changes in utilization were minimal” [Neprash
(2015)]. Furthermore, Cuellar and Gertler have also found that vertical integration “is
associated with an increase in prices, especially when the integrated organization is
exclusive and occurs in less competitive markets” [Cuellar (2006)].
Although most literature argues that vertical integration has shown to increase
prices, other literature presents support for lowering prices. For example, another
study, which uses Medicare data, physician integration data from SKA, and American
Hospital Association survey data, finds that having “an integrated PCP does not in-
crease health care spending” [Wagner (2016)]. Another study with data from California
for the years 1994-2001 finds that “Integration among rural hospitals is associated with
large price decreases” [Ciliberto (2006)]. However, the authors admit that the pool of
rural hospitals in their sample is small. When using the entire dataset, they “find that
neither integration nor disintegration was associated with significant changes in prices”
[Ciliberto (2006)].
2.2 Transaction Costs
Advocacy for or against vertical integration also considers the relationship between
vertical integration and transaction costs. Transaction costs are costs associated with
the coordination between different providers in the health care delivery system. This in-
cludes negotiating contracts, monitoring, and enforcing agreements [Robinson (1996)].
Literature that supports vertical integration finds that it decreases transaction
costs. Literature against vertical integration has shown that decreases in inter-market
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transaction costs are supplanted with increased costs from intra-market transactions.
For example, in a study comprised of interviews with physicians and hospital admin-
istrators, monitoring, coordination, and cooperation costs are new transaction costs
associated with the structural change [Cho (2015)]. In addition, another paper has
asserted that there is “little if any gain in shifting the transaction costs of negotiat-
ing, monitoring, and enforcing agreements from the external market to the internal
pseudomarket” [Robinson et. al (1996)].
2.3 Health Outcomes
An additional argument prevalent in literature against physician-hospital integra-
tion rests on the premise that integration not only increases spending and prices, but
that it also does not improve health outcomes as theoretically expected. Observing
the impact of physician-hospital affiliations on “the treatment of Medicare patients
with a diagnosis of acute myocardial infarction admitted to general medical-surgical
hospitals between 1994 and 1998” reveals that integration is associated with higher
prices, “while little evidence exists that hospital–physician affiliations in the aggregate
have. . . any measurable impact on patient treatment or outcomes” [Madison (2004)].
However, as additional literature on this topic emerges, so too does more support for
vertical integration as improving health outcomes. In the paper “”Effect of physician-
hospital financial integration on health outcomes and spending”, the author observes
the impact of having an integrated primary care physician on the following health
outcomes: “death, an unplanned hospital admission, and an appropriate emergency
department visit” [Wagner (2016)]. The sample of patients in the study have condi-
tions for which preventative care, such as PCP visits, should diminish the need for
hospital care. As explained in the paper, these conditions are referred to as “ambula-
tory care sensitive chronic conditions” (ACSCCs). The study concludes the following:
“having an integrated primary care physician (PCP) does not significantly affect av-
erage mortality risk, but does reduce the risk of less severe adverse health outcomes
attributable to conditions that are treatable in primary care settings” [Wagner (2016)].
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In addition, older studies on the effect of integration on health outcomes lacked
crucial additional data that may have severely biased results. The paper referenced
directly above used better and broader data as compared to other literature, which
had reached conclusions of no effect on health outcomes. In fact, Wagner directly cited
the paper by Madison (2004) as lacking adequate information on physician practices.
Furthermore, other literature considered only inpatient data in analysis, while Wag-
ner included information for patients from inpatient facilities as well as “outpatient
facilities, . . . skilled nursing facilities, and physician office settings” [Wagner (2016)].
2.4 Quality Improvement Mechanisms
Physician-hospital integration is thought to improve quality of care (and health
outcomes) via several mechanisms such as better care coordination and improved com-
munication, shared electronic medical records (EMRs), and realigned physician in-
centives. When coordination and communication between physicians and hospitals is
fragmented, patients are more likely to receive conflicting treatment plans that can
impede progress in health status at best, and incite adverse events at worst. Using
data from a survey of 253 clinicians for about “1,614 patient visits between May and
December 2003”, Smith and others have found that clinicians “reported missing clinical
information in 13.6% of visits; missing information [for] laboratory results (6.1% of all
visits), . . . radiology results (3.8%), history and physical examination (3.7%), and med-
ications (3.2%)” [Smith (2005)]. Better coordination and communication can improve
health outcomes by reducing excessive test duplication. Reducing the unnecessary rep-
etition of the same exams for a single patient can improve health outcomes because
some tests, such as radiology tests, can have dangerous side effects, such as radiation
poisoning. Furthermore, test errors of type II (false positive) can lead to unnecessary
additional testing and emotional damage.
EMRs can further aid communication and coordination between providers by pro-
viding an easily accessible platform where patient information can be shared between
participating facilities. In fact, integrated hospitals are more likely to use health IT
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[Lammers (2013)] than nonintegrated hospitals. Since physician-hospital integration
consolidates physicians and hospitals into a single system, integrated physicians and in-
tegrated hospitals share EMRs. Shared EMRs can improve quality of care by reducing
complications and deaths from events such as adverse drug interactions.
Additionally, integration can improve quality of care by augmenting the physician
role to lean more towards medical provider rather than entrepreneur. As further ex-
plained by Wagner, “shifting the ‘business aspects’ of a physician practice to a hospital
may allow physicians to specialize in patient care, which could result in higher qual-
ity primary care” [Wagner (2016)]. Hospital ownership of physician practices removes
administrative concerns, which allows physicians to devote more time and effort to
patients. In addition, if physician salaries are fixed, physicians no longer have the in-
centive to see many patients as fast as possible. “Physicians as entrepreneurs stand to
capture the full financial benefit of activities in their practice, unlike physicians who
are employees” [Wagner (2016)].
2.5 Quality of Care and Malpractice Claims
Literature on the relationship between malpractice claims and quality of care pre-
dominately discusses this topic in the context of how malpractice liability impacts
physician behavior and delivery systems rather than in the context of how malpractice
damages patients directly. For example, Baicker and Chandra examine the impact of
malpractice costs on the size of the physician workforce. They find that “malpractice
payments made on behalf of physicians. . . may deter marginal entry, increase marginal
exit, and reduce the rural physician workforce” [Baicker (2005)]. Reduction in the sup-
ply of physicians, while demand remains the same, can negativity impact quality of
care by increasing waiting times.
Brook and colleagues posit three channels through which malpractice claims can
impact quality of care, albeit the first two of these three channels also do not reflect
implications of actual damages on quality of care. The three channels are the following:
premium differentials, sanctions against a health care provider facility; and damage to
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“the physician-patient relationship” [Brook (1975)].
Another paper examines a more direct effect of malpractice claims on quality of care
rather than on physician workforce size and physician malpractice premiums. Safety
is among the six domains of health care quality reported by the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ). This safety domain is described as “Avoiding harm
to patients from the care that is intended to help them” (AHRQ 2018). Negligence
is a violation of patient safety. Therefore, the malpractice claims filed in response to
negligence are indicators of safety violation. Using Patient Safety Indicators from the
AHRQ for rates of 17 adverse events for Florida and Texas, revealed “a strong associ-
ation between PSI rates and malpractice claim rates” [Black 2015]. This implies that
“hospitals that improve patient safety can reduce malpractice payouts” [Black 2015].
Improvement of Patient Safety Indicators can happen via the quality improvement




This study draws from four different datasets. The end goal is an unbalanced panel
dataset of hospitals from 1998 to 2013 with information on the integration status and
the total count of claims for each hospital in each year. The data on malpractice claims
is downloaded from the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation 1. This dataset contains
claims of two types, those against physicians working in hospitals and those against
hospitals directly. In order to merge the malpractice claims data with the vertical
integration data, both must contain a Medicare number corresponding either to the
hospital in which the sued physician works or to the sued hospital itself.
The vertical integration data from the AHA Survey contains a plethora of binary
variables for several integration types. However, I follow the definitions from Baker et
1https://apps.fldfs.com/PLCR/Search/MPLClaim.aspx
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al. (2014) and focus on the following four integration types: fully integrated organiza-
tions, closed physician-hospital organizations, open physician-hospital organizations,
and independent practice. The primary integration type of interest in this paper is
“fully integrated organizations.” Observing the integration data in detail reveals many
missing values for any type of integration, largely because hospitals do not respond to
the AHA survey every year. Given this data limitation, I imputed integration types
based on hospital responses in the preceding and succeeding years to fill in the miss-
ing values. For example, if a hospital had indicated that it was not fully integrated
(vertically-integrated) in 2011 and in 2016 and if this hospital was also missing a re-
sponse for any integration type for the years in between, then a value of 0 was imputed
for those intermediate years (2012 to 2015). After combining integration data for years
1998 to 2013, imputing, and de-duplicating values, the data set yields 3,588 observa-
tions. After combining the FL AHCA financial data for all years (1998 to 2013) and
de-duplicating values, the data set yields 4,637 observations.
In the malpractice data, the variable “InsuredLicenseNumber” provides the state
license numbers for malpractice claims against physicians. Claims with missing values
for this variable are claims against hospitals (or other types of health care facilities).
The malpractice data set does not contain the facility number or the Medicare number
needed to merge with the survey data on vertical integration. For this reason, I sepa-
rated the claims with and without “InsuredLicenseNumber”. Next, my advisor and I
used the FL AHCA patient discharge data to find out where physicians worked. The
FL AHCA patient discharge data contains the universe of inpatient visits and ambu-
latory surgery center (ASCs) visits in Florida, and every record contains an attending
physician license number corresponding to the physician who provided services. My
advisor merged the malpractice claims against physicians with the FL AHCA discharge
data, and then collapsed the data to the hospital-year level. The resulting data set
contained the number of malpractice claims against physicians working in each hospital
in each year. Then I merged the hospital-year data set with the FL AHCA hospital
financial data using facility numbers to obtain each hospital’s Medicare number. Then
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the data set with claims against physicians contained the Medicare numbers for all
hospitals. Hospitals with no claims were not dropped from the merge, but were in-
stead kept to include the entire universe of hospitals in Florida. The resulting dataset
contained 3,245 observations (this is not the same as total count of claims) and was
then merged with the vertical integration data from the AHA Survey, culminating with
2,879 observations. Chart 1 details the changes in the number of observations after
keeping only claims with license numbers, applying restrictions, and merging.
Claims against medical facilities (claims missing physician license numbers) could
not be merged to the FL AHCA patient discharge data. Instead, this group of claims
required imputation of facility numbers by hand. Ambulatory surgery centers (ASC)
and hospital inpatient (IP) lists taken from the AHCA provide yearly data including
facility number and facility name. The variable “InsuredName” in the malpractice
dataset includes the name of the hospital/surgery center. Imputing by hand required
matching the hospital name listed under “InsuredName” with the name listed in the
ASC/IP list. To make merging with the FL AHCA hospital financial data and AHA
survey data possible, the dataset with claims against hospitals was collapsed by facility
number and year. After collapsing, the total number of observations decreased to 2,216;
however, the total number of claims was still 11,442. The claims with imputed facility
numbers were then merged with the FL AHCA hospital financial data using facility
number and year to obtain the corresponding Medicare number. Finally, merging with
the AHA Survey data left 6,136 total claims and 1,027 observations. The malpractice
claims that were dropped from the sample were claims against facilities other than
hospitals (e.g., physician practices, clinics, etc.) Chart 2 summarizes the changes
in observations and count of claims after applying restrictions, imputing data, and
merging.
After conducting the appropriate merges to obtain the Medicare number for each
group of malpractice claims, the two groups of claims were merged together to comprise
a complete set of malpractice claims against both physicians and hospitals. Combining
the two data sets yields a total of 2,929 hospital-year observations. This dataset con-
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tains the entire universe of hospitals, meaning that some hospitals may have 0 claims
for both types. Additionally, some hospitals may have only claims against hospitals
directly or only claims against physicians. When constructing the variable for total
claims, I added the two types of claims together for each hospital in each year.
3.2 Data Statistics
Table 1 includes descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent variables
used in the analysis. As mentioned previously, all outcome variables are derived from
malpractice claims downloaded from the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation. Infor-
mation on hospital integration status and the number of hospital beds comes from the
AHA Survey. Information on patient race is derived from the FL AHCA discharge data.
About 18% of hospitals in the sample from 1998 to 2013 were vertically integrated.
Percent of each race type is calculated by dividing the count of each race type
by the total number of inpatient and outpatient visits to the hospital in a given year.
The averages reported for %White Patients, %Black Patients, %Hispanic Patients, and
%Other Race Patients in Table 1 indicate the average share of each race type in the
entire sample from 1998 to 2013. The shares are consistent with race shares reported
by the US Census Bureau for Florida. The majority of patients in the sample are white
(73%). Black, Hispanic, and Other race types constitute the remaining share, 13%,
11%, and 3% respectively.
The average number of claims against physicians, claims against hospitals, and
total claims for vertically integrated hospitals is 15, 3, and 18 respectively. The average
number of claims against physicians, claims against hospitals, and total claims for non-
integrated hospitals is 13, 2, and 15 respectively. Although higher claim averages for
vertically integrated hospitals may initially seem counter intuitive to the results of this
paper, hospitals that vertically integrated may have been larger, and hence more likely
to have claims because they treat more patients.
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4 Methodology
The study utilized a linear model with entity and time fixed effects and a negative
binomial model with entity and time fixed effects to examine the effects of vertical
integration on malpractice claims. Outcome variables include the count of claims, cost
of claims, and claims of different severity type. Independent variables include a binary
variable indicating whether the hospital is vertically integrated in a given year, the
number of hospital beds at a hospital in a given year, and percent of visits by patients
of different races by hospital per year. The following race type categories are included:
white, black, and Hispanic. Other race types are excluded and the coefficients on white,
black, and Hispanic are interpreted relative to “other race”.
The vertical integration variable equals 1 if a hospital is vertically integrated in a
given year, and 0 otherwise. Larger hospitals may receive more claims and may have
higher costs associated with claims because they receive a larger influx of patients. To
control for hospital size, I included the count of hospital beds for each hospital in each
year. I divide the count of hospital beds by 100 to ease interpretation of the associated
coefficient. Other characteristics of hospitals can also impact the count, cost, and types
of claims that hospitals receive. Excluding these characteristics from the model results
in omitted variable bias. However, if these characteristics are constant within hospitals
over time, then using entity fixed effects should difference out the unobserved effects.
This should reduce omitted variable bias.
Similarly, including time fixed effects should control for omitted variables that
change over time, but are common to all hospitals. For example, in 2003 the gov-
ernor of Florida, Jeb Bush, signed a bill aimed at reducing medical malpractice costs.
This bill placed a cap on the amount that plaintiffs can sue for in a malpractice case.
Excluding variables related to this bill can result in omitted variable bias. However,
since this bill applied to the entire state of Florida, it should have impacted all hospi-
tals in the same way. Therefore, including year fixed effects ought to reduce omitted
variable bias from these types of policy changes. Figure 1 plots the average cost of
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total claims per hospital per year. The average cost of total claims peaks around the
year 2000 and then begins to decline around the time the bill took effect. This presents
further support for including year fixed effects into the model.
Although this study is aggregated to the hospital level, the types of patients that
sort into each hospital may vary demographically. Therefore, the likelihood that a
claim is filed at each hospital for the same type of negligence may vary. In addition,
the likelihood for negligence to occur in the first place may vary for patients with dif-
ferent conditions; patients with more problematic conditions and patients that require
riskier procedures are more likely to experience a complication. Given this, controlling
for patient demographics may be important to the model. Other papers have con-
trolled for patient demographics by controlling for patients with certain chronic condi-
tions. Another study that observes the impact of PCP-hospital integration on health
outcomes, used “asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), diabetes,
heart failure, and hypertension” [Wagner (2016)] to control for patient demographics.
The FL AHCA discharge data provides Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) codes. DRG
codes assign patients to over 500 different groups based on “principal diagnosis, specific
secondary diagnoses, procedures, sex and discharge status” (CMS 2016). Therefore,
utilizing these codes would be a good way to capture the overall health of patients
as well as the likelihood that patients will experience adverse events. In light of pre-
vious literature, I attempted to control for the following conditions using associated
DRG codes: asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), diabetes, heart
failure, and hypertension. The count of patients for each DRG code per hospital per
year were included as additional controls. Unfortunately, the DRG codes available in
the data set are MS-DRG codes, which are specific to Medicare patients only. Since
the analysis observes claims for patients with Medicare, Medicaid, private, and other
insurance types, only using the MS-DRG codes does not capture the total count of
patients in the data set with these conditions. As expected, the counts of patients
for each condition per hospital per year are very low. Including variables for counts
of each condition (asthma, COPD, diabetes, heart failure, and hypertension) does not
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yield significant results nor does the inclusion of these variables significantly change
the results of other coefficients. For this reason, MS-DRG code variables are removed
from the model as covariates.
Counts of physicians per hospital per year was an additional covariate explored.
This variable was included in an attempt to control for hospital size. However, number
of hospital beds is a better control for this purpose. Since count of physicians and
count of hospital beds per hospital per year are highly correlated, count of physicians
was removed from the model.
Other control variables explored include the percentage of visits by patients with
different types of insurance. Insurance types included in the FL AHCA discharge
data set are the following: Private Insurance, Medicaid, Medicare, Self, and Other.
Insurance type captures inherent differences between patients that can influence the
outcome variables in this analysis. For example, patients with Medicare are older
and are more likely to have co-morbidities as well as more complicated conditions. In
addition, patients with private insurance usually have higher socioeconomic status than
patients with Medicaid or Medicare. Socioeconomic status can determine capacity to
bring a malpractice suit against a physician or a hospital. Therefore, hospitals with
larger volumes of patients with payer type “private” may be more likely to generate
claims. I convert counts of each payer type into percentages by dividing each count
by the total number of inpatient and outpatient visits to the hospital. Coefficients for
percentages of each payer type are usually not significant in the model. In addition,
payer types are highly correlated with the race variables included in the model. Whites
are more likely to have private insurance. Minorities such as blacks and Hispanics have
lower incomes on average than whites and are more likely to have the insurance type
“Medicaid”. To avoid high multicollinearity, I removed the payer type variables from
the model.
Figure 2 reveals that the distribution of total claims per hospital around the mean
is not the same in each year, indicating heterogeneity in the data. Similarly, Figure 3
sheds light on heterogeneity in total costs associated with claims. To address this, I
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specified the robust standard errors option for all models. The linear model with entity
and time fixed effects is
Yit = β0 + β1V Iit + β2#HospitalBedsit + β3%WhitePatientsit + (1)
β4%BlackPatientsit + β5%HispanicPatientsit + γi + δt + Uit
where Yit is the dependent variable. The indices i and t indicate entity and time,
respectively. V Iit is the independent variable for vertical integration status and β1 is
the coefficient estimate for the impact of vertical integration on the outcome variable.
%WhitePatientsit, %BlackPatientsit, and %HispanicPatientsit indicate the percent
of each race type in each hospital in each year. The percent of each race type is
multiplied by 10 to interpret the unit change for these variables as 10%. γi are the
hospital fixed effects. δt are the year fixed effects. The form of the mean function for
a negative binomial model with entity and time fixed effects is
E(Yi|Xi) = µi = exp(β0 + β1V Iit + β2#HospitalBedsit + β3%WhitePatientsit + (2)
β4%BlackPatientsit + β5%HispanicPatientsit + γi + δt)
A negative binomial model is an appropriate model for this sample because most of the
outcome variables in this study are count data. In addition, the outcome variables are
over dispersed (the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean). For example,
observing Figures 2 and 3 clearly shows greater variation in the number and cost of
claims as compared to the mean number of claims and costs in each year.
5 Results
Columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 2 report output from the linear model. Although the
coefficients are not statistically significant, the coefficients for vertical integration are
consistently negative. Column 4 of Table 2 reports results from a negative binomial
estimation. The outcome variable is Total Claims. The coefficient for vertical inte-
gration is statistically significant at the 5% level. The results indicate that vertically
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integrated hospitals have 7% fewer claims per year as compared to hospitals that are
not vertically integrated. As can be seen in Figures 4 and 5, the average total claims
per hospital steadily decline after peaking in the year 2000 while the share of vertically
integrated hospitals begins to increase around this time.
Table 3 reports the effects of vertical integration on the costs of malpractice claims
using the linear model. The outcome variable in Column 1 of Table 3 is Total Cost of
Claims. The results indicate that vertically integrated hospitals see a decline of about
$522,000 in costs associated with malpractice claims per year. When alternating the
outcome variable to the log of the total cost of claims, total cost per visit, and the
log of total cost per visit, the coefficient on vertical integration is no longer significant.
However, the sign estimates are consistent with the results of Column 1.
Table 4 reports the estimates from regressions on malpractice claims of different
severity types. All regressions in this table use a negative binomial model. The coef-
ficient on vertical integration is not significant when regressing on any of the distinct
severity types. However, the magnitude of the coefficient on vertical integration is
negative, which is consistent with the results of Table 2 and Table 3. In addition, lack
of significance when Claims w/Deaths is the dependent variable is consistent with the
results Wager (2016) finds when exploring the impact of PCP-integration on mortality.
Coefficients on %Black Patients are significant and negative across all models, ex-
cept when the outcome variables are Claims Against Hospitals and Claims w/Emotional
Damage (Table 2 Column 2 and Table 4 Column 4). Table 2 Column 4 indicates that
a 10% increase in visits by black patients decreases the total number of claims by 35%.
Table 3 Column 1 indicates that a 10% increase in visits by black patients decreases the
cost of claims by about $1.8 million. Increases in the percent of black patients visits
to a hospital may cause a significant decrease in claims and costs if black patients are
less likely to sue. Differences in socioeconomic status and the corresponding capacity
to bring a lawsuit against a hospital may be the mechanism driving this relationship.
Patients from lower socioeconomic backgrounds may have less access to, and may be
less familiar, with the legal system. Minorities (such as blacks) are more likely to have
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a lower socioeconomic status. Therefore, an increase in visits from a population with
a smaller likelihood of suing would yield a decline in the number of claims.
The share of vertically integrated hospitals per year (Figure 5) is consistent with
the integration trends reported in the literature. Previous literature describes a decline
in the prevalence of vertically integrated hospitals in the late 1990s. As can be seen in
Figure 5, the share of vertically integrated hospitals in the sample was the lowest in
the 1990s and early 2000s (below 10%). Other literature also describes a rapid increase
in the prevalence of vertically integrated hospitals in the mid-2000s. As can be seen
from Figure 5, the share of integrated hospitals in the sample drastically increases after
2005. Conversely, the average total claims per year (Figure 1) and the average cost of
total claims per year (Figure 4) begin to drastically decrease after 2005. This provides
additional visual representation for the inverse relationship between integration and
malpractice claims suggested in this paper.
6 Limitations
Limitations to consider in this study stem from data issues as well as external
policies. Gaps in integration status responses from the AHA survey required the im-
putation of integration status for several hospitals over several years. Although the
method of imputation is consistent with the methods in the literature, the model most
likely has high measurement error. If the measurement error is classical, then there
may be attenuation bias in the estimates. However, if the measurement error is more
complicated or correlated with other time-varying characteristics of hospitals, then the
bias in the coefficient estimates is less predictable.
Although I attempted to control for differences in the severity of patients’ medical
conditions across hospitals, I ultimately was not able to do so due to data limitation
and time constraints. If sicker patients sort into integrated hospitals, the impact of
integration on outcomes variables may be understated. If instead sicker patients sort
into non-integrated hospitals, then the impact of integration on outcomes variables
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may be overstated.
In addition, the cap placed on malpractice payouts by Governor Jeb Bush in 2003
may be an additional source for concern. Although including time fixed effects in
the model should account for this policy change, the actual impact of the cap may
not have impacted all hospitals equally. If the cap impacted larger hospitals more
than smaller hospitals and if larger hospitals also receive more claims than smaller
hospitals and larger hospitals were more likely to integrate, then the reduction in costs
associated with malpractice claims may be falsely attributed to change in physician-
hospital integration status rather than the cap.
7 Discussion
The results of this paper indicate an inverse relationship between vertical integra-
tion status and the count, as well as the total cost, of malpractice claims. On average,
vertically integrated hospitals have 7% fewer claims per year compared to hospitals
that are not vertically integrated. In addition, vertically integrated hospitals experi-
ence a decline of about $522,000 in costs associated with malpractice claims. Vertical
integration can lower the count and costs of claims via the following mechanisms:
better care coordination and improved communication, shared EMRs, and realigned
physician incentives. As mentioned previously, fragmented or conflicting treatment
plans can lead to redundant medical testing. In addition, provider gaps in knowledge
can lead to prescribing drugs with severe interactions or contraindications. Excessive
medical testing and conflicting prescriptions create opportunities for adverse events to
occur, and adverse events that result from negligence can lead to malpractice suits.
Physician-hospital integration encourages provider communication because it consol-
idates physicians and hospitals into a single system. In addition, shared electronic
medical records help keep track of recent testing and prescriptions assigned to patients.
The coordination improvements brought about by integration decrease the chances for
repetitive testing and injuries or deaths from conflicting medications - thereby reducing
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the likelihood of events that can lead to a malpractice suit.
The coefficient on vertical integration is consistently negative across all models
(except when Claims w/Emotional Damage is the dependent variable). However, the
impact of vertical integration on count of claims is only significant when using a nega-
tive binomial. The impact of vertical integration on claims against physicians, claims
against hospitals, or total claims is not significant when using a linear model. These
results indicate that the relationship between integration status and claims is not linear
– it seems rational that it would not be. Structural changes associated with physician-
hospital integration may decrease malpractice claims only up to a certain point. Hospi-
tals with large quantities of suits may benefit less than hospitals with moderate or low
quantities of suits. Most likely, hospitals which experience an overwhelming number
of claims every year also have organizational and clinical problems that may not nec-
essarily be easily solved by integrating. In fact, since integration requires even more
coordination between providers, and if coordination is already an issue, integration
may actually further increase the number of total claims brought against a hospital.
Hence, I suspect the relationship between integration and malpractice claims may be
parabolic and convex. Further research could test other, possibly more appropriate,
models.
As mentioned in the literature review section of this paper, previous literature does
not focus on the direct implications of malpractice claims on quality of care, but instead
observes impacts on physician premiums and other facets. This paper contributes to
the literature with more direct focus on the implications of claims for quality of care.
Reduction in malpractice claims implies improvement in the quality of care because it
signals a decline in adverse events. As mentioned previously, safety is one of the six
components of quality of care, as defined by AHRQ, and Patient Safety Indicator rates
provide information on “hospital complications and adverse events” (AHRQ 2018).
Black (2015) and colleagues have found “a strong association between PSI rates and
malpractice claim rates” [Black (2015)]. If vertical integration reduces adverse events
via coordination improvement (and other mechanisms stated above), then integration
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should decrease PSI rates, thereby also decreasing malpractice claims.
Although some current literature on vertical integration suggests that transaction
costs are not decreased, but are instead shifted elsewhere, results from this paper sug-
gest that decreased costs from malpractice claims may supplant increased intra-market
transaction costs. Other literature suggests that there is “little if any gain in shifting
the transaction costs” [Robinson et. al 1996], however, if the source of costs carries im-
plications for associated quality of care, then there is gain in shifting transaction costs.
If transaction costs associated with internal maintenance are paired with improvements
in quality, while transaction costs associated with maintaining external relationships
are not, then it may be sensible to shift the cost source. Furthermore, improved quality
may improve hospital reputation. This may attract more patients and may increase
profits in the long-run.
8 Conclusion
The implications of physician-hospital integration can be positive or negative as
seen from the literature. However, this paper focuses on the positive implications,
specifically for quality of care. Although vertical integration may increase prices for
services, the corresponding benefits from a decline in adverse events and improved
quality of care may be worth the cost.
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9 Charts
Chart 1: Constructing Dataset with Claims Against Physicians
Action Original Removed New
Keep Claims w License Numbers 44,671 18,097 26,574
Keep Claims w ME and OS License Numbers 26,574 4,257 22,317
De-duplicate 22,317 643 21,674
Keep Only 1998 to 2013 21,674 1,352 20,060
Collapse, Merge to Discharge and Financial Data 20,060 NA 3,245
Merge with AHA Survey Data 3,245 563 2,879
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Chart 2: Constructing Dataset with Claims Against Hospitals
Action Original Removed New
Keep claims with out License Numbers 44,671 26,574 18,097
De-duplicate 18,097 542 17,555
Keep only 1997 to 2013 17,555 1,696 15,859
Keep Only Claims with Imputation 15,859 4,567 11,342
Collapse by Facility Number and Year 11,342 NA 2,172
Merge with Financial Data 11,342 / 2,172 1,590 / 440 9,779 / 1,732
Merge with AHA Survey Data 9,779 / 1,732 3,719 / 743 6,136 / 1,027
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10 Figures
Figure 1: Total Cost per Year
Source: Constructed using FL AHCA Financial Data, AHA Survey Data, FL AHCA Discharge
Data, and FL Malpractice Claims from the Office of Insurance Regulation for the
years 1998 to 2013.
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Figure 2: Heterogeneity in Total Claims
Source: Constructed using FL AHCA Financial Data, AHA Survey Data, FL AHCA Discharge
Data, and FL Malpractice Claims from the Office of Insurance Regulation for the
years 1998 to 2013.
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Figure 3: Heterogeneity in Total Costs of Claims
Source: Constructed using FL AHCA Financial Data, AHA Survey Data, FL AHCA Discharge
Data, and FL Malpractice Claims from the Office of Insurance Regulation for the
years 1998 to 2013.
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Figure 4: Average Total Claims per Hospital per Year
Source: Constructed using FL AHCA Financial Data, AHA Survey Data, FL AHCA Discharge
Data, and FL Malpractice Claims from the Office of Insurance Regulation for the
years 1998 to 2013.
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Figure 5: Share of Vertically Integrated Hospitals per Year
Source: Constructed using FL AHCA Financial Data, AHA Survey Data, FL AHCA Discharge
Data, and FL Malpractice Claims from the Office of Insurance Regulation for the
years 1998 to 2013.
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11 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Outcome Variables Mean SD N
#Physician Claims 13 13 2,929
#Hospital Claims 2 5 2,929
#Total Claims 16 15 2,929
#Claims w/Deaths 6 6 2,929
#Claims w/Major Damage 4 5 2,929
#Claims w/Minor Damage 5 5 2,929
#Claims w/Emotional Damage 1 3 2,929
Total Cost of Claims ($s) 3,289,613 4,888,713 2,929
ln(Total Cost of Claims) (in $s) 13 4 2,929
Total Cost Per Visit ($s) 232 416 2,850
ln(Total Cost Per Visit) (in $s) 5 2 2,850
Control Variables Mean SD N
Vertically Integrated Hospitals 0.18 0.38 2,929
#Hospital Beds 264 269 2,929
%White Patients 0.73 0.22 2,850
%Black Patients 0.13 0.11 2,850
%Hispanic Patients 0.11 0.18 2,850
%Other Race Patients 0.03 0.03 2,850
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Table 2: The Effects of Vertical Integration
on the Counts of Malpractice Claims
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Claims Claims Total Total
Against Against Claims Claims
Physicians Hospitals
VI -0.57 -0.17 -0.74 -0.07∗∗
(0.81) (0.46) (0.96) (0.03)
Hospital Beds -0.23 0.52∗ 0.29 0.02
(0.43) (0.29) (0.60) (0.01)
%White Patients -0.22 -0.20 -0.42 0.002
(0.34) (0.21) (0.36) (0.02)
%Black Patients -6.07∗∗∗ 0.86 -5.21∗∗∗ -0.35∗∗∗
(1.36) (0.56) (1.52) (0.05)
%Hispanic Patients 0.27 -0.33 -0.05 0.02
(0.40) (0.28) (0.46) (0.02)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.20 0.24 N/A
Observations 2,850 2,850 2,850 2,850
SE in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: Estimated using FL AHCA Financial Data, AHA Survey Data, FL AHCA
Discharge Data, and FL Malpractice Claims from the Office of Insurance Regulation
for the years 1998 to 2013.
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Table 3: The Effects of Vertical Integration
on the Costs of Malpractice Claims
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Cost ln(Total Cost Total Cost ln(Total Cost
of Claims of Claims) Per Visit Per Visit)
VI -527,057∗∗ -0.08 -21.27 -0.10
(220,517) (0.08) (15.03) (0.08)
Hospital Beds -337,058∗∗ -0.04 -5.49 -0.06∗
(131,245) (0.03) (5.71) (0.03)
%White Patients -154,049 0.09 -1.87 0.10∗
(290,968) (0.07) (20.57) (0.05)
%Black Patients -1,817,662∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗ -123.09∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗
(507,355) (0.15) (40.44) (0.14)
%Hispanic Patients -482,000 0.04 -26.96 0.03
(342,084) (0.06) (24.02) (0.05)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.10 0.14 0.05 0.13
Observations 2,850 2,850 2,850 2,850
SE in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: Estimated using FL AHCA Financial Data, AHA Survey Data, FL AHCA
Discharge Data, and FL Malpractice Claims from the Office of Insurance Regulation
for the years 1998 to 2013.
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Table 4: The Effects of Vertical Integration
on Types of Malpractice Claims
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Claims w/ Claims w/ Claims w/ Claims w/
Deaths Major Minor Emotional
Damage Damage Damage
VI -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12)
Hospital Beds 0.05∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.02 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
%White Patients -0.05∗∗∗ 0.10 0.02 0.08
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.10)
%Black Patients -0.42∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.37∗∗∗ -0.17
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.18)
%Hispanic Patients 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.10
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.09)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24
Observations 2,850 2,850 2,850 2,850
SE in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Source: Estimated using FL AHCA Financial Data, AHA Survey Data, FL AHCA
Discharge Data, and FL Malpractice Claims from the Office of Insurance Regulation
for the years 1998 to 2013.
32
12 References
[1] Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2018), ‘Six Domains of Health Care
Quality’. URL: https://www.ahrq.gov/talkingquality/measures/six-domains.html
[2] Baicker, Katherine, and Amitabh Chandra. “The effect of malpractice liability on
the delivery of health care.” Forum for Health Economics Policy. Vol. 8. No. 1.
De Gruyter, 2005.
[3] Baker, Laurence C., M. Kate Bundorf, and Daniel P. Kessler. “Vertical integra-
tion: hospital ownership of physician practices is associated with higher prices and
spending.” Health Affairs33.5 (2014): 756-763.
[4] Bazzoli, Gloria J., et al. “Two decades of organizational change in health care:
what have we learned?.” Medical Care Research and Review 61.3 (2004): 247-331.
[5] Berenson, Robert A. “A Physician’s Perspective On Vertical Integration.” Health
Affairs 36.9 (2017): 1585-1590.
[6] Black, Bernard S., Amy R. Wagner, and Zenon Zabinski. “The association between
patient safety indicators and medical malpractice risk: Evidence from Texas.” So-
cial Science Research Network (SSRN) (2015).
[7] Brook, Robert H., Rudolf L. Brutoco, and Kathleen N. Williams. “The relation-
ship between medical malpractice and quality of care.” Duke LJ (1975): 1197.
[8] Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2016), ‘Defin-
ing the Medicare Severity Diagnosis Related Groups’.
URL:https://www.cms.gov/ICD10Manual/version34-fullcode-
cms/fullcode cms/Defining the Medicare Severity Diagnosis Related Groups (MS-
DRGs) PBL-038.pdf
[9] Cho, Na-Eun. “Costs of physician-hospital integration.” Medicine 94.42 (2015).
33
[10] Ciliberto, Federico, and David Dranove. “The effect of physician–hospital affilia-
tions on hospital prices in California.” Journal of Health Economics 25.1 (2006):
29-38.
[11] Cuellar, Alison Evans, and Paul J. Gertler. “Strategic integration of hospitals and
physicians.” Journal of health economics 25.1 (2006): 1-28.
[12] Cutler, David M., and Dan P. Ly. 2011. “The (Paper)Work of Medicine: Under-
standing International Medical Costs.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25 (2):
3-25.
[13] Gaynor, Martin. “Is vertical integration anticompetitive?: Definitely maybe (but
that’s not final).” Journal of Health Economics 25.1 (2006): 175-180.
[14] Lammers, E. (2013), “The effect of hospital-physician integration on health infor-
mation technology adoption”, Health economics 22, 1215–1229.
[15] Madison, Kristin. “Hospital–physician affiliations and patient treatments, expen-
ditures, and outcomes.” Health services research 39.2 (2004): 257-278.
[16] Morrisey, Michael A., et al. “Managed Care and Physician/Hospital Integration:
Is managed care driving hospitals and physicians toward more integration? New
national data uncover the trends.” Health Affairs 15.4 (1996): 62-73.
[17] Neprash, Hannah T., et al. “Association of financial integration between physicians
and hospitals with commercial health care prices.” JAMA internal medicine 175.12
(2015): 1932-1939.
[18] Robinson, James C., and Lawrence P. Casalino. “Vertical integration and organi-
zational networks in health care.” Health Affairs 15.1 (1996): 7-22.
[19] Smith, Peter C., et al. “Missing clinical information during primary care vis-
its.” Jama 293.5 (2005): 565-571
34
[20] Wagner, A. “Effect of physician-hospital financial integration on health outcomes
and spending.” (2016).
35
